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Abstract
Consumers have shown a willingness to pay a premium for products labeled as “Fair Trade,” and to
prefer retailers that are seen as more generous to their suppliers/employees. A fair trade product
is essentially a bundle of a base product and a donation to the supplier (e.g., a coffee farmer). An
altruistic rational consumer will only choose this bundle if doing so is less expensive than buying the
base product and making a direct donation. Thus, for fair trade to be sustainable in a competitive
equilibrium, this bundling must yield an efficiency. This efficiency is generated in the following
context. A supplier’s investment reduces the retailer’s cost or boosts the final product’s quality.
This investment is non-verifiable, hence the first-best level is not achieved. In this environment, the
altruism of the consumer can facilitate a more efficient contract: by paying the supplier more, the
retailer can both extract more consumer surplus and increase the level of contracted investment,
while preserving the supplier’s incentive compatibility. We provide some evidence for this model,
focusing on the coffee industry.
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1 Introduction
A significant subset of consumers have shown a willingness to pay a premium for products
labeled as “Fair Trade,” and to prefer retailers that are seen as more generous to their
suppliers and employees (The Economist [2007a], Maietta [2003], De Pelsmacker, Driesen
and Rayp [2005]).1 The size of fair trade and “ethical products” market is large and growing:
global sales exceed $2.3 billion worldwide (Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International
[2007]). Some economists and policy analysts have been dismissive of such behavior, arguing
that altruistic consumers could help the suppliers more effectively by making direct transfers
(Zehner [2002], Booth and Whetstone [2007], The Economist [2006]). These authors imply
that consumers who purchase fair trade must be uninformed or irrational. In contrast, we
show that even consumers who are fully informed and rational may prefer to purchase the
fair trade product.
In our model, one consumer is altruistic; this consumer’s utility function depends (in
part) on the impact of her actions on others.2 She is also informed: she knows the net
results of her choices on the surpluses of all relevant parties. Finally, she is rational in the
conventional economic sense: she maximizes her utility. We refer to the consumer who meets
these assumptions as “AIR”: altruistic, informed, and rational. These assumptions allow
us to make a strong case for fair trade. Our model demonstrates that even the “wise” AIR
consumer still may want to purchase the fair trade product.
1We are not discussing “fair trade” in the context of a government’s international trade policy. Our model
applies to products directly marketed to consumers as fair trade. It is also relevant when consumers care
about employees’ surpluses, such as in the case of the anti-sweatshop movement.
2The consumer weighs these outcomes according to a neutral social welfare function (See, e.g. Rawls
[1971]) A neutral social welfare function is one that weights the utility of all agents equally ex ante. This
implies that utility from altruism does not depend directly on the amount sacrificed, nor on the manner of
the contribution. Our assumption is consistent with several models of giving, including the public goods
model (Becker [1974]), the impact model (Duncan [2004]), and a specific interpretation of the reciprocity
model (Sugden [1984]) or the warm glow model (Andreoni [1990]).
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We model a fair trade product as a bundle of a base product and an act of altruism, e.g., a
direct donation. An AIR consumer will only choose this bundle (the base product and a direct
donation) if purchasing the bundle is cheaper than purchasing both elements separately.
The bundle can be produced at a lower cost through the following mechanism. A retailer
and a supplier sign a contract where the supplier makes an investment that reduces the
retailer’s costs. This investment is non-verifiable, hence there is under-investment compared
to the first-best efficient investment level. However, a retailer who pays his supplier more is
in essence offering the aforementioned direct donation, and thus can capture the altruistic
component of the consumer’s utility. This larger payment increases the supplier’s net benefit
of complying with the contract. Thus the contract can specify larger investment, closer to the
first-best efficient level, while maintaining the supplier’s incentive compatibility constraint.
Through this increased investment, the bundle is produced at a lower cost. We further show
that the AIR consumer’s willingness to pay a premium for a fair trade product may result in
an even larger premium going to the supplier. A variation of the mechanism above, where
the investment boosts the quality of the base product, yields the same results.
Some scholars have argued that labeling certain products as fair trade will decrease
market efficiency by distorting market price (Lindsey [2004], Booth and Whetstone [2007],
Harford [2006], Sidwell [2008]). In contrast, our model suggests that fair trade is not a
harmful distortion but a successful innovation in a competitive environment with rational
consumers. This innovation increases welfare, even when we measure the welfare excluding
the altruistic component of consumers’ utilities.
Section 2 presents our model and our theoretical results. In Section 3, we provide a
literature review of theoretical work on fair trade. In Section 4, we present anecdotal and
empirical evidence (in the context of coffee) supporting both our modeling assumptions and
our model’s predictions. Section 5 concludes and offers suggestions for future research.
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2 Model
Our model shows how consumer altruism can lead a firm to offer a fair trade product in a
competitive environment. We assume that all retailers have access to the same production
process, and that fair trade producers do not have an inherent advantage over charities in
providing the altruistic good.
2.1 Primitives
For intuition, we state our model in terms of coffee, but our analysis applies to a wider set
of industries. There are four types of actors in our model: coffee farmers, coffee roasters,
altruistic consumers, and non-altruistic consumers. A unit of coffee is produced jointly; a
farmer (F ) grows and prepares the beans and a roaster/retailer (R) buys them, processes
them, and sells them to a consumer whose valuation of the coffee is v. The retail market for
coffee is perfectly competitive. However, each roaster has bargaining power over the farmers
he buys from. Empirical work suggests that the retail coffee market is a fairly competitive
industry, while small coffee farmers have little to no market power, and are not well-organized
(Dicum and Luttinger [1999], Hayes [2006], Zehner [2002], Lindsey [2004]).3
Each farmer can either produce a unit of coffee or produce nothing. A roaster bears the
cost of processing a unit of coffee c(m). This cost is determined by the farmer’s investment
m ≥ 0. For example, a farmer may carefully sort and clean the beans, and thus save the
roaster the cost of doing so. m decreases the processing cost at a decreasing rate, i.e.,
c′(m) < 0 and c′′(m) > 0.4
3From a theoretical point of view, a firm can have a monopsony power over the input suppliers, and, at
the same time, be a perfectly competitive retailer. As an example, consider the case with a single consumer
having unit demand, two roasters each of whom has the potential to produce one unit of roasted coffee beans,
and three farmers each of whom has the capacity to produce one unit of coffee beans.
4We model the farmer’s investment as cost-reducing rather than quantity-boosting. In the case of a
quantity-boosting investment, a higher premium to the farmer would induce higher investment and output.
4
Alternatively, we could interpret c(0) − c(m) as an improvement of quality resulting
from investment m. Under this interpretation, the consumers’ utility from the coffee will be
v−c(m), and all of the subsequent results will be preserved. We suppress this interpretation
in main text, but we model it in Appendix A.2.
A roaster pays α ≥ 0 to a farmer for each unit of coffee. The farmer’s net profit from
(α,m) is n := α −m. n will have the same effect on the altruistic consumer’s utility as an
n dollar donation to the farmer. Thus, we often refer to the farmer’s net profit n as the
consumer’s donation. We refer to (n,m) as “the contract” between a farmer and a roaster.
The roaster’s bargaining power allows him to set the contract.
Once having purchased and processed the coffee, the roasters sell this product to the
consumers. The coffee is branded “coffee n”, or simply coffee(n). Roasters face market price
P (n) for coffee(n). The profit of a roaster producing and selling coffee(n) with contract
(n,m) is
piR(n,m) = P (n)− (n+m)− c(m) since n+m = α.
Note that we assume here that the roaster cannot deceive consumers over the level of n.
Both the altruistic and the non-altruistic consumers have unit demand for coffee. The
altruistic component of utility is additively separable from the coffee consumption compo-
nent. Let v represent the two consumers’ identical valuation of coffee. Thus, the utilities
are v for the non-altruistic consumer and v + a(n) for the altruistic consumer, where a(n)
is the altruistic component. We assume that v is large enough so that consumers choose to
consume coffee. We further assume that the consumers have quasi-linear utility with respect
to money, so their net utilities given price P (n) are
UA(n) = v + a(n)− P (n) and U0(n) = v − P (n).
for the the altruistic consumer and the non-altruistic consumer, respectively. The marginal
However, if supply is competitive enough, the roaster could achieve the same goal by simply contracting
with more farmers at the regular zero-premium.
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utility of donation n is positive, decreasing in n, and less than unity:
a′(n) > 0, a′′(n) < 0
a′(0) ≤ 1. (1)
Note that these three conditions imply a(n) ≤ n. Inequality (1) means that the first dollar
donation gives less than a dollar utility to the altruistic consumer. We impose this stringent
condition to make the strongest case for the potential efficiency of fair trade. This assumption
implies that consumers will only buy fair trade coffee if the premium they pay for such coffee
is less than the resulting increase in the farmer’s income. Thus, our story of fair trade must
explain how and when this “magnification” can occur. In Appendix A.1, we provide intuition
for Inequality (1), and illustrate that relaxing this stringent assumption only strengthens the
case for fair trade.
A period of interaction among the economic agents has the following timing:
(i) A roaster R announces contract (n,m), which becomes common knowledge.
(ii) A farmer F invests m˜.
(iii) The roaster R pays α = n+m to F without observing m˜.
(iv) The roaster R’s production cost, c(m˜), is observed by the roaster, but is unverifiable.
(v) Consumers buy coffee(n) at price P (n).
There is information asymmetry. Within each period, m˜ is unobservable to the roaster
before payment of α = n + m and unverifiable even after the observation of c(m˜). Thus,
even if a farmer deviates to m˜ 6= m, the roaster cannot sue for damages. On the other hand,
we assume that the roaster always pays the α = n+m that is specified in the contract. This
is without loss of generality: we could extend our model so that the threat of a successful
suit by a farmer or NGO will prevent the roaster’s deviation.
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This interaction may be repeated once or infinitely. We refer to (n,m) = (0, 0) as the
termination of contract. This might be used to punish the farmer for deviation m˜ 6= m in
the previous period.
2.2 Maximization and competitive equilibrium
As a benchmark, we present a one-period interaction between the farmer and the roaster.
The farmer’s profit is α − m˜. For any level of α = n + m, it is always optimal to choose
m˜ = 0. Considering a(n) ≤ n, the roaster does not want to implement n > 0 since even
the altruistic consumer’s appreciation a(n) of the farmer’s profit n (that is the upper-bound
that the roaster can possibly extract) is smaller than the cost, n. Thus the only sustainable
contract is (n,m) = (0, 0).
Next we consider an infinite-period interaction. Cooperation implementing strictly pos-
itive n and m can be sustained if each party plays a grim trigger strategy. Each party
cooperates as long as all parties previously cooperated; otherwise, the roaster will propose
(n,m) = (0, 0), and the farmer sets m = 0 for any (n,m). If the farmer defects from contract
(n,m) by investing m˜ = 0, he receives α = n + m for that period. However, the roaster
will terminate contract (n,m) after detecting the deviation. Thus the farmer will get zero
profit from the next period onwards.5 Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint for
a farmer is
n+m ≤
∞∑
t=1
δF
t−1n ⇐⇒ n ≥ 1− δF
δF
m [ICF ]
The roaster chooses an optimal contract subject to [ICF ]. Given price P (n), the roaster’s
profit maximization problem is
max
(n,m)
[P (n)− (n+m)− c(m)] s.t. [ICF ].
5The assumption of of zero payoffs forever is a simplification: if the farmer who defects has the option to
sign a contract with another roaster, but with a costly delay, the qualitative results are preserved.
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This optimization can be decomposed into two steps: the roaster chooses m for a given n,
and then he chooses n. Firstly, facing the incentive compatibility constraint, the optimal
feasible investment for a given n is m(n) = argmax
m
{
P (n)− (n+m)− c(m) : n ≥ 1−δF
δF
m
}
.
Secondly, a roaster’s objective is to choose n that maximizes his profit, i.e., the roasters’
choice of n maximizes piR(n) := [P (n)− (n+m(n))− c(m(n))].
Facing price P (n), a consumer will choose n to maximize her net utility. Define
nCA = argmax
n
[v + a(n)− P (n)] and nC0 = argmax
n
[v − P (n)].
The altruistic consumer purchases coffee(nCA), which we call “fair trade coffee.” The non-
altruistic consumer purchases coffee(nC0 ), which we call “regular coffee.”
Because the roasters are perfectly competitive, profit will be driven down to zero. While
there are many roasters who can produce, we assume, without loss of generality, that only
two choose to produce. We define nRA and n
R
0 as the choices of the two roasters, i.e.,
nRA, n
R
0 ∈ argmax
n
pi(n).
In a Walrasian equilibrium, the roasters’ choices and the consumers’ choices must agree, i.e.,
the market clearance condition will be
nCA = n
R
A and n
C
0 = n
R
0 .
To summarize,
Definition 1 A vector < (nCA, n
C
0 ), (n
R
A, n
R
0 ), (P (n))n≥0 > is an equilibrium if and only if the
following conditions hold.
Consumers’ Problem : nCA ∈ argmax
nA
[v + a(nA)− P (nA)]
nC0 ∈ argmax
n0
[v − P (n0)]
Roasters’ Problem : nRA, n
R
0 ∈ argmax
n
max
m(n)
{
P (n)− (n+m(n))− c(m(n)) : n ≥ 1− δF
δF
m(n)
}
Market Clearance : nCA = n
R
A, n
C
0 = n
R
0 .
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The price-taking behavior of farmers is not incorporated in the definition of equilibrium.
Instead, the farmer’s role in the definition is only through a constraint on the roasters’
achievable n and m. We will show that nA and n0 are positive under certain parameter
values: farmers who have contracts with roasters (whether fair trade or not) receive strictly
positive profit, while farmers who do not have contracts receive zero profit. Without the in-
centive compatibility constraint of farmers, this “rationing” would not have occurred: other
farmers would have accepted a contract with lower n and the same m. The bids would
eventually lower the profit of the farmers to zero; hence, no rationing. This rationing pre-
vents the incorporation of farmers’ optimization problems into the definition of a Walrasian
equilibrium. Similar rationing is found in credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]) and
general equilibrium principal-agent problems (Bennardo and Chiappori [2003]). We discuss
the welfare implications of this assumption in Section 2.3.
Finally, we characterize an equilibrium. Let mEF satisfy 1 = −c′(mEF ); this defines the
first best level of investment since the marginal cost of the investment is equivalent to the
marginal benefit, i.e., the marginal reduction of processing cost. For given n, if [ICF ] does
not bind, the optimal investment is m(n) = mEF . Since 1 + c
′(m) < 0 for m < mEF , we
conclude
m(n) = min
{
mEF ,
δF
1− δF n
}
.
Thus we derive the profit function of the roaster supplying coffee(n):
piR(n) =
P (n)−
n
1−δF − c
(
δF
1−δF n
)
if m(n) = δF
1−δF n
P (n)− (n+mEF )− c(mEF ) if m(n) = mEF
Since roasters are perfectly competitive each roaster earns zero profit, i.e.,
P (n) =

n
1−δF + c
(
δF
1−δF n
)
if n is such that m(n) = δF
1−δF n,
(n+mEF ) + c(mEF ) if n is such that m(n) = mEF .
(2)
9
Let nEF :=
1−δF
δF
mEF . Given the price in (2), the altruistic consumer’s problem is:
nCA =

argmax
n
[v + a(n)− n
1−δF − c
(
δF
1−δF n
)
] if n < nEF ,
argmax
n
[v + a(n)− (n+mEF )− c(mEF )] if n ≥ nEF .
But note that d
dn
[v + a(n)− (n+mEF )− c(mEF )] < 0. In other words, n ≥ nEF cannot be
an optimum. Thus it is enough to consider only
nCA = argmax
n
[v + a(n)− n
1− δF − c
( δF
1− δF n
)
].
For the non-altruistic consumer, we can derive a similar result,
nC0 = argmax
n
[v − n
1− δF − c
( δF
1− δF n
)
].
The necessary and sufficient conditions for strictly positive nA and n0 are:
Condition 1 −c′(0) > 1
δF
.
Condition 2 1−δF
δF
a′(0) + (−c′(0)) > 1
δF
.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the surpluses of farmers nA := n
R
A = n
C
A and n0 := n
R
0 = n
C
0
satisfy:
(i) n0 > 0 if and only if Condition 1 holds, and
(ii) nA > 0 if and only if Condition 2 holds.
Proof. This results are trivially derived from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the con-
sumers’ maximization problem.
Proposition 1 implies that, as the farmer becomes impatient, the potential for long-term
cooperation declines.6 In order to have positive investment without consumer altruism, the
6It is trivial for (i). For (ii), −c′(0) must be larger than a′(0) to have nA > 0. (If not, (1 − δF )a′(0) +
δF (−c′(0)) ≤ 1 since a′(0) ≤ 1.) Thus the result follows.
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first-dollar marginal benefit of investment (−c′(0)) must exceed the marginal cost of inducing
the investment ( 1
δF
). This includes both the marginal (unit) cost of compensating the farmer
for his investment and the marginal cost of providing the farmer an incentive (1−δF
δF
, derived
from [ICF ]) not to deviate. With an altruistic consumer, the roaster gets an additional
benefit from the first unit of investment, 1−δF
δF
a′(0). However, since a′(0) ≤ 1, consumer
altruism alone will never be sufficient for positive investment; the investment must also be
sufficiently cost-reducing.
Under Condition 1 and Condition 2, we derive the following first order conditions:
(1− δF )a′(nA) + δF
(
−c′
( δF
1− δF nA
))
= 1 for the altruistic consumer [FOCA]
δF
(
−c′
( δF
1− δF n0
))
= 1 for the non-altruistic consumer [FOC0]
From Proposition 1, we derive the following corollary which further characterizes the
equilibrium.
Corollary 1 Under Condition 2, (i) nA > n0, and (ii) P (nA) > P (n0).
Proof. Since a′(n) > 0, we trivially derive the first result from the two first order conditions.
P (n) = n
1−δF +c
(
δF
1−δF n
)
within a relevant range of δF
1−δF n < mEF . The first order derivative
of the price is P ′(n) = 1
1−δF +
δF
1−δF c
′
(
δF
1−δF n
)
> 0. Thus the price increases in n.
If we interpret m as an investment that boosts quality (as in Appendix A.2), a strict
interpretation of our model would imply that only altruistic consumers purchase high-quality
coffee, and that high-quality coffee is always fair trade. However, this no longer holds if we
extend our model to include some real-world complications. If the non-altruistic consumers
have heterogeneous tastes, some may purchase the fair trade coffee because it is high-quality.
Also, if production has a stochastic component, some coffee for which the farmers are not
highly paid will be high quality by chance. Alternatively, the production process itself may
vary from region to region. In some regions, upstream investment may be verifiable at a
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certain cost, and thus quality can be improved without paying the farmer too much of a
premium (but consumers may have horizontally-differentiated tastes, so no region’s coffee
will dominate).
In summary we have characterized the equilibrium contracts for four cases, as shown in
the following table.
Without Altruism With Altruism
Short-term interaction [1] (n,m) = (0, 0) [2] (n,m) = (0, 0)
Long-term interaction [3] (n,m) = (n0,m0)
[4] (n,m) = (nA,mA)
We argue that the institution of fair trade moves the equilibrium contract from [3] to [4].
However, if fair trade itself makes cooperation possible, (i.e., the transition from [1] to [4]),
as some advocates claim, the benefits of fair trade are even greater.
2.3 Comparative statics and welfare analysis
In this section, we consider how an increase in altruism affects the economic agents’ util-
ities/profits as well as the welfare of the economy. We consider a parametrized altruism
function βa(n) with β ∈ [0, 1]. An increase in β implies an increase in the utility an altruis-
tic consumer derives from the income passed to the farmer.7 We restate Condition 2 for this
parametrization:
Condition 2a (1− δF )βa′(0) + δF (−c′(0)) > 1.
Note that β is included in Condition 2a, as the new altruism function is βa(n).
7An alternative parametrization would be through an increase in the proportion of altruistic consumers.
In the previous section, we derived nA > n0 and mA > m0. These four values remain the same even if we
increase the proportion of altruists. However, the average level of farmers’ profit and investment will increase
as more altruists means an increased demand for the fair trade product.
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For certain parametric values, altruism makes a non-trivial contract possible when it was
impossible otherwise. Suppose a(·) and c(·) fail to satisfy Condition 1, but satisfy Condition
2a. Proposition 1 implies that n0 = 0 and nA > 0; hence, m0 = 0 and mA > 0.
More generally, altruism increases the level of investment m and the profit of the farmer
n.
Proposition 2
Under Condition 2a,
dnA
dβ
> 0 and
dmA
dβ
> 0.
Proof. With the re-defined altruism component of utility βa(n), [FOCA] is
(1− δF )βa′(nA) + δF
(
−c′
(
δF
1− δF nA
))
= 1.
Total-differentiating the constraint with respect to β and nA, we derive
dnA
dβ
= − a
′
βa′′ −
(
δF
1−δF
)2
c′′
> 0; hence,
dmA
dβ
=
δF
1− δF
dnA
dβ
> 0.
However note that the level of investment is always below the first-best: mEF is not
achieved for any level of β.8
We also prove that the fair trade premium the farmer receives exceeds the premium the
altruistic consumer pays, i.e., the altruistic consumer’s willingness to pay a small additional
amount results in an even larger rent paid to farmer.
Proposition 3 Under Condition 2, P (nA)− P (n0) < nA − n0
Proof. The fact that the altruistic consumer has chosen nA over n0 implies
v + a(nA)− P (nA) ≥ v + a(n0)− P (n0).
8mA is determined by (1−δF )βa′( 1−δFδF mA)+δF (−c′(mA)) = 1, while mEF is determined by −c′(mEF ) =
1. The only way −c′(mA) = 1 is to have βa′( 1−δFδF mA) = 1. From the given assumption on function a(·),
the case is possible only if β = 1 and a′( 1−δFδF mA) = 1. However such case implies mA = 0, which is not the
efficient level of investment.
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Thus we derive P (nA) − P (n0) ≤ a(nA) − a(n0). We also derive a(nA) − a(n0) < nA − n0
from a′(·) ≤ 1. The result follows.
Finally we analyze the effect of the increased altruism on the welfare of the economy.
We consider only the welfare of altruistic consumer, fair trade coffee roasters, and fair trade
farmers, since β has no effect on any other parties. Welfare is:
W (n,m) = [v + βa(n)] + [−(n+m)− c(m)] + [n] = v + βa(n)−m− c(m).
In contrast to the classical general equilibrium approach, we include the monetary transfer
α = n + m (hence, n as well) in our definition of welfare because the transfer affects the
altruistic consumer’s utility.
We also define welfare net of altruism:
WN(n,m) := W (n,m)− βa(n) = v −m− c(m).
The effect of increased altruism on welfare can be decomposed into three parts: (a), (b), and
(c) in the equation below.
d
dβ
[v + βa(nA)−mA − c(mA)] = ∂
∂β
[βa(nA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+ βa′(nA)
dnA
dβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
+
d
dβ
[v −mA − c(mA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
We focus on the case satisfying Condition 2a, i.e., nA > 0 and mA > 0. Otherwise, an
increase in altruism will have no effect on welfare, since the farmers receive zero surplus
both before and after a small increase in β.
(a) measures the direct effect of the increase in β. The direct effect represents the
obvious increase in surplus as the product takes on additional altruism value. (b) measures
β’s indirect effect through the increased n. As the consumer altruism increases, the roaster
adapts the product to this change, which in turn increases welfare. (c) measures the indirect
effect, as higher investment leads to a net reduction of costs:
d
dβ
[v −mA − c(mA)] = d
dβ
WN(n,m) = −(1 + c′(mA))dmA
dβ
> 0 since 1 + c′(mA) < 0.
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We can think of the beneficial effect of altruism being magnified through the investment of
the farmer. Since the indirect effect (c) is positive, we see that not only can an increase in
altruism increase welfare, it will also increase welfare net of altruism. Thus we prove our
main proposition:
Proposition 4 Under Condition 2a, an increase in altruism increases welfare net of altru-
ism. Otherwise, a small change in altruism has no effect on welfare.
We can alternatively consider the welfare excluding farmers’ utility, which we call do-
mestic welfare. If the farmer is in a different country, this is relevant to those policy makers
who care only about the domestic consumers and retailers. The domestic welfare is
WD(n,m) = [v + βa(n)] + [−(n+m)− c(m)] = v + βa(n)− (n+m)− c(m).
The second-best efficient allocation (with respect to the domestic welfare) is defined as the
choice of (n,m) that maximizes the domestic welfare subject to the incentive compatibility
constraints of the farmers:
max
n,m
[v + βa(n)− (n+m)− c(m)] s.t. n ≥ 1− δF
δF
m.
The first order condition for the maximization problem is identical to [FOCA]. In other
words, the equilibrium outcome is also the policy maker’s most preferred outcome. Thus we
have proved a welfare theorem.
Proposition 5 (Welfare Theorem) The equilibrium of Definition 1 is second-best effi-
cient with respect to the domestic welfare. Also, a second-best efficient allocation in terms
of the domestic welfare can be obtained as an equilibrium.
3 Literature review: theories of fair trade
Other authors have attempted to explain and/or justify fair trade, either explaining how a
retailer might offer the bundled fair trade product at a lower cost to the altruistic consumer,
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or why the consumer might be willing to buy the bundle even at a higher price. These
models depend on either production-side, consumption-side, or strategic explanations.
3.1 Production-side
Several theories purport to explain how the product-donation bundle could be produced at
a lower cost than the separate elements. However, we contend that any such theory must
explain why such economies depend on the unique position of the fair trade roaster relative
to the regular roaster.
Advocates of fair trade often claim that it allows roasters to directly trade with farmers,
and this eliminates a node in the supply chain (Transfair USA [2001]). However, if such ver-
tical integration eliminated unproductive middlemen or eliminated a layer of marginalization
(markups), it would also be implemented by traditional roasters, nullifying fair trade’s ad-
vantage. A related justification for the efficiency of fair trade is the elimination of monopsony
rents (Hayes [2006]). However, these rents can be maintained in equilibrium only if there are
barriers to entry, or if a local market is a natural monopsony (See, e.g., Bain [1956]). Fair
trade buyers would need to enter these markets and force the incumbent to exit. Without
an efficiency story, this should be an uphill battle, as fair trade buyers must pay more for
their inputs.
Some have argued that fair trade itself may be a more efficient way of helping the poor.
The proponents of “trade not aid” argue that traditional public-sector aid and charity will
have a demoralizing and dis-incentivizing effect, fostering a dependent mentality (Rugasira
[2007]). We find this argument dubious: offering a higher price than the traditional market
rate could itself be seen as a “handout,” and it may bring inefficient distortions of its own.
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3.2 Consumption externalities and consumer behavior
If the consumer has a specific concern for the utility of the producers of the precise products
they consume, e.g., because of a fairness norm (Rabin [1993]), the advantage of the fair
trade bundling is clear. It would be prohibitively expensive for a consumer to track down
exact same farmer who grew her coffee. Buying the fair trade product may also help the
consumer’s reputation in a way that donating to charity cannot do. Such purchases may be
visible to family, friends, and colleagues, as well as the cute stranger in the coffee shop; it is
not as easy or socially acceptable to advertise one’s level of direct charitable contributions.
Some consumers may use the fair trade products as a way to remember to give, pace their
giving, and solve self-control and commitment problems. Finally, as skeptics of fair trade
claim, the consumers may simply be misinformed or engage in flawed logic. Consumers may
either believe that buying fair trade is the most effective contribution they can make, or they
might fail to consider that they can make a more efficient or effective gift.
We cannot dismiss the possibility that some consumers are motivated by the factors
above. However, we believe that altruistic consumers will not be systematically misinformed
about the effects of fair trade, which is under the intense scrutiny of NGO’s, consumer
groups, and governments. Furthermore, in Section 4, we will offer suggestive evidence that
bundling the donation and the base product may yield a cost savings; this cost savings could
not be explained by the arguments resting only on consumers’ behavior. Fundamentally, as
stated in the introduction, assuming an AIR consumer enables us to make a stronger case
for fair trade.
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3.3 Other strategic goals
If altruists have a lower valuation of the base product than non-altruists, bundling coffee and
a donation may be used as a tool for price discrimination.9 However, conventional wisdom
(e.g., Harford [2006]) suggests that consumers of fair trade tend to have higher incomes
and greater willingness to pay for products such as coffee. Booth and Whetstone (2007)
claim that fair trade can be used as a tool for segmenting the market and giving firms
in each segment greater market power over prices. Casual observation suggests that the
coffee market is not highly concentrated, with numerous boutique cafes and many choices of
fair trade and regular coffee in major supermarkets. This theory also fails to explain why
a company like Starbucks would offer both types of coffee. A final possibility is that the
roasters offering fair trade coffee may be taking a loss on this product, at least in the short
term, but achieving other strategic goals. Roasters may offer this product for public relations
reasons, or as a “loss leader” to cross-subsidize other products. However, this cannot explain
why some roasters solely offer fair trade products.
4 Empirical evidence: conditions and outcomes
The main goal of the fair trade coffee movement is to support coffee cooperatives and improve
the standards of living for coffee farmers by paying a “fair” price. Secondary goals include
helping cooperatives gain access to world markets, offering credit at fair rates, and promoting
environmentally sustainable agriculture (Transfair USA [2001], Bird and Hughes [1997]). The
International Fair Trade Labeling Organization (FLO), established in 1997, maintains a Fair
Trade Register of cooperatives (groups of small farmers who pool some of their resources)
9In a continuous demand model, this would be interpreted in terms of a higher price-elasticity. Note that
if altruists have a higher value of the base product (but are AIR), this would not allow for any useful price
discrimination since the altruists could always choose the cheaper coffee and give the savings as a direct
donation.
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that they have selected to participate, and that meet certain minimum conditions.10 These
cooperatives are eligible to sell some of their coffee to roasters and importers to be designated
with a fair trade certification. To qualify for a fair trade label, importers and roasters must
pay a set minimum price (which varies slightly by coffee origin and type) above the world
market rate.11
We assess whether the model described is relevant to industries in which fair trade has
been touted, focusing on the coffee industry. We assess whether the assumptions driving our
model are plausible, and then examine whether the premia resemble those predicted by our
model.
4.1 Conditions
Our model depends on the upstream firm making investments to reduce downstream costs
and/or boost quality. Such investments are important in the coffee growing industry (The
Economist [2007b]). Coffee production generally involves the same basic stages – grow-
ing, harvesting, de-pulping, drying, sorting, grading, bagging, and roasting – but there are
important variations in technique at each stage (Dicum and Luttinger [1999]).
These investments are difficult to verify and enforce. It may be expensive to write and
register a contract over such investment, expensive to go to court in the event of a breach,
and/or courts may not be able to reliably determine the level of investment. In many
of the poor agricultural regions where fair trade operates, the expense of such a process
would outweigh any gains, and there may be no reliable legal authority. Appendix A.3
compares ratings for “legal enforcement of contracts” and “legal system and property rights”
10Similar arrangements not affiliated with the FLO, such as Starbucks’ CAFE scheme and Cadbury’s
Cocoa Partnership, are equally captured by our model.
11This is a simplification. There are other requirements both for cooperatives and importers/roasters.
These include labor and green standards, and specified contract terms such as which include providing some
short-term credit to farmers. In addition, if the world coffee price rises high enough, the importers need not
pay a premium.
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for the home countries of fair trade farmers and for several major industrial countries. Not
surprisingly, the scores for the fair trade origin countries are fairly low.
In our model, farmers who are paid fair trade prices invest more than their otherwise
equivalent counterparts. Those involved in fair trade directly make this claim of a higher
level of investment.12 There is much evidence of a moral hazard problem in this industry.
Zehner (2002) notes “growers may lie about the geographical origin of their crop or add
low-quality beans or dirt and stones to the bags of coffee they supply.”
4.2 Outcomes
Our model of AIR consumers predicts that the premium they pay (per unit) for the fair
trade attribute is less than or equal to the premium that the farmers receive. Harford (2006)
has noted that Costa coffee in London charged an extra 10 pence for a cup of fair trade
coffee even though the premium paid on the beans used was less than a penny. This simple
estimate was cited by other authors (Sidwell [2008] and The Economist [2006]).
As seen in Table 1 of page 21, several papers have estimated the premium that consumers
are willing to pay for products labeled as fair trade or having other ethical attributes. Maietta
(2003) performs a hedonic regression with a semi-log functional form on Italian supermarket
scanner data (from IRI’s Infoscan Database) and shows a large (1.07 USD/lb from 1998-
2002)13 and significant average premium paid for the fair trade component of coffee purchases
(separate from the premium for the organic component). Gallaraga and Markandya (2004)
use UK retail price data from 1997-98 to estimate a similar model, and find (for an average
grade of coffee) an 11.26% increase in price for the “green” (fair trade, organic, shade) coffee.
This is a markup on a base price of 11.73 Euro/Kg, an average premium of 0.60 Euro/lb.
Galarraga and Markandya (2004) have a richer measure of coffee attributes; they commission
an expert assessment of several taste characteristics. On the other hand, Maietta (2003) have
12Rodney North, Equal Exchange. From email correspondence with [one of the authors, deleted], 2003
13Converted from 2.36 Euros/Kg at an average (over this period) exchange rate of 1.00 Euros/USD.
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a larger data set, albeit for a market where fair trade was less prominent. Neither of these
studies yields a satisfactory estimate of the premium that would exist in a larger and well-
established fair trade market, such as the UK in 2008, where fair trade coffee has an 18%
market share (Fairtrade Foundation [2008]).
Few papers have directly compared the premium consumers pay for fair trade products
to the premium that the targeted suppliers receive.14 Zehner (2002) offers one such estimate,
finding (for a leading case) “the $0.67 [per pound of green coffee in 2000] received by the
grower represents only 45 percent of the retail price premium [of $1.50/lb for his Starbucks
example].” He concludes that “the Fair Trade premium is an inefficient subsidy.”
However, certain features of his calculations are crude and depend on strong and unreal-
istic assumptions.15 In particular, his estimate of the retail premium is based on looking at
a few major retail brands in the US (Starbucks and Coffee Bean) and assuming that the he-
donic characteristics of their Fair Trade blends are identical to those of their “house blends,”
which are generally their least expensive offerings.16 Coffee is far from a homogenous prod-
uct (Galarraga and Markandya [2004]). Starbucks “Fair Trade Blend” is described as “a
dynamic blend of washed Arabica coffees with a flavor profile similar to Latin American cof-
fees.” If we compare it to Colombia Narin˜o Supremo, “a straightforward invigorating brew,
with medium-body and smooth nuances,” we find a consumer premium of only $0.50 per lb.,
and Zehner’s conclusions are reversed. Comparing Peet’s Fair Trade Blend to their “Blend
101,” a coffee that is (according to Peets.com) very similar in body and acidity, we find they
14The simple analysis of Eshuis and Hansen (2003) allows a comparison of these premia. It makes somewhat
arbitrary comparisons – as in Zehner’s paper – and it comes to an opposite conclusion to Zehner’s.
15Zehner also makes the simple error of comparing units of green coffee to units of roasted coffee. According
to the USDA Guidelines on Food Processing, 1.2 pounds of green coffee are required to produce one pound
of roasted coffee. We correct Zehner’s error in Table 1.
16The Coffee Review (Coffeereview.com) a site that conducts “blind, expert cuppings of coffee” and pub-
lishes ratings on a scale of zero to 100. They rated Starbucks house blend 77 in 2000, and 80 in 2003;
Starbucks Narino Supremo was given 87 points. While Starbuck’s Fair Trade Blend was unfortunately not
rated, Peet’s Fair Trade blend was rated 87 in 2004.
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are the same price. Thus, we find some support, albeit anecdotal, for our result that the
premium that consumers pay may be smaller than the premium that farmers receive.
5 Conclusion
A typical economic argument for laissez faire is that prices signal economic agents to maxi-
mize their own welfare, and this leads to efficiency. This view criticizes the practice of fair
trade by claiming that catering to consumers’ altruism distorts prices, and thus reduces effi-
ciency. However, we have shown that, in the presence of an information asymmetry problem
(the moral hazard problem of farmers), their claimed “distortion” of price (higher premium
for fair trade coffee) actually represents the use of a concerned outsider (altruistic consumers)
to increase efficiency (more efficient investment).
Our finding suggests a generalization that is applicable to contract theory. Parties in-
volved in a bargaining situation may find it useful to involve an outsider who is concerned
with the outcome. In turn, this could alleviate the inefficiency caused by the presence of
information asymmetry.
Future empirical work will be able to more precisely test the relevance of our model to
particular industries and markets. Our model implies that non-verifiable investment will be
below the efficient level, even in repeated relationships, while consumer altruism can induce
a more favorable long-term contract. A detailed examination of production data will reveal
whether, ceteris paribus, suppliers getting a larger premium (e.g., fair trade farmers) invest
more in quality and in reducing downstream costs. We predict that consumer premium for
fair trade must not exceed the premium paid to farmers, and provide some evidence. This
can be tested by comparing the coefficient on a fair trade dummy in a hedonic regression at
the consumer level (using, e.g., recent supermarket scanner data) to a similar coefficient in
a regression at the farmer level.
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A Appendix
A.1 Altruism Component of Consumer’s Utility
We assume that the first dollar donation gives less than a dollar utility to the altruistic consumer,
i.e., a′(·) ≤ 1. This assumption is stringent; it requires us to build a model in which the altruistic
consumer buys fair trade coffee, even though he would not make a direct donation to the farmer.
Although the altruistic consumer may have a marginal utility of giving that is larger than unity
(a′(·) > 1), the assumption that a′(·) ≤ 1 is without loss of generality. We show this in two ways.
A.1.1 Residual willingness to donate
The consumer’s valuation of the coffee itself is p0, and we define u(z) as the value a consumer places
on making a gift of z to the farmer. Assume u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, and limz→∞ u′(z) < 1: the marginal
return to such gifts is positive, decreasing in the gifts, and less than the marginal cost of donation
for large gifts.
We assume a “costless” technology (e.g., a charity) for transferring donations to farmers, so that
a donor who wants to give z to the farmer can do so at cost c(z) = z. (however, a generalization
is possible.)17 Thus, u′(z) = c′(z) determines the optimal donation amount. If no such positive z
exists, z = 0 (no donation) is the optimal solution. Define a(x) = u(x+ z)−u(z). Function a(x) is
the “residual” willingness to pay for the fair trade attribute (assuming separability and no income
effect).
In reality, the consumer will choose the optimal bundle of the donation, fair trade coffee, and
other commodities simultaneously. However, the consumption of fair trade coffee will be only a
small fraction of the entire bundle. Thus consideration of the consumer’s residual altruism (i.e.,
assuming a′(·) ≤ 1) is a reasonable approximation.
17We could generalize this to a case where c(z) = (1− t)(1 + k)z, where t is the consumers’ marginal tax
rate (if a consumer itemizes tax-deductions), and k represents the fees associated with transferring such a
donation. Furthermore, we could imagine other charitable donations are close substitutes, perhaps valued
more highly than gifts to farmers.
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A.1.2 Simultaneous decision
Again, u(z) is the value a consumer places on making a gift of z to the farmer. We do not need
to assume, as in the previous section, that the decision over direct donations precedes the decision
whether to buy the fair trade product; we can allow a simultaneous choice. Because the consumer
can make a direct donation at unit price (i.e., a costless technology for transferring money to
farmers), the consumer is willing to pay at most x to increase the farmer’s income by x. Thus, the
willingness to pay for x is
a(x) = min(u(x), x).
Thus a′(x) ≤ 1 is derived from the above.
This yields a result that may seem unreasonable: an altruistic consumer will never strictly
prefer to make a direct donation (over channeling her gift through fair trade). This would suggest
that even if a consumer wants to give $10,000 to the farmer (i.e., a′($10, 000) = 1) but only values
a single unit of coffee, she may buy the unit of coffee at a price above $10,000. However, if the
consumer values a dollar donation to a charity slightly above a dollar given to the supplier, she
may choose to make a fair trade purchase as well as a direct donation, even under a simultaneous
decision.
The first unit of money passed to the farmers through fair trade coffee has two positive effects:
one is to increase the altruistic consumer’s utility, and the other is to alleviate the agency problem
related to the investment. However, at a high level of donation, the second positive effect will be
close to zero. Thus, if there is a slight preference for making a direct donation, then a consumer
who is sufficiently altruistic will choose to buy fair trade coffee as well as make a direct donation.
It is plausible to assume that some consumers prefer direct charitable donations because charities
can help those in extreme poverty, not just coffee farmers.
A.2 Quality interpretation
Coffee is branded “coffee (n, q),” where n is the transfer to the farmer, and q is the quality of the
coffee. Consumer’s valuation of coffee is v + q. The quality of the coffee, q, depends upon the
farmer’s investment m, i.e., q = q(m). q(m) corresponds to −c(m) in the cost reduction story.
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Now that the characteristics of each coffee are represented by vector (n, q), the price is also
indexed by vector (n, q), i.e., P (n, q). The consumers’ problems are:
max
n,q
[v + q − P (n, q)] and max
n,q
[v + q + a(n)− P (n, q)]
for the non-altruistic consumer and the altruistic consumer, respectively.
The producer’s problem is
max
n,q
{
P (n, q)− (n+m) : q = q(m) and n ≥ 1− δF
δF
m
}
From the assumption of perfectly competitive roasters, we derive
P (n, q) = n+m(q)
where m(q) is an inverse function of q(m).
We consider a pair of (n, q) satisfying the binding incentive compatibility constraint, i.e., n =
1−δF
δF
m(q). A pair satisfying n < 1−δFδF m(q) is not feasible, and a pair satisfying n >
1−δF
δF
m(q) is
not optimal. Hence, the price function is simplified into
p(q) := P
(1− δF
δF
m(q), q
)
=
1− δF
δF
m(q) +m(q) =
m(q)
δF
where m(q) is the inverse function of q(m) and n(q) := 1−δFδF m(q).
In summary, even though the price system seems more complex than the one in the cost reduc-
tion story (as it is indexed by a two-dimensional vector (n, q) rather than n only), the price system
can be reduced to be one dimensional.
Finally we show that these two interpretations are identical by demonstrating that the first order
conditions under the quality interpretation are identical to those derived from the cost reduction
model. The consumers’ maximization problems with the derived price function p(q) are:
max
q
[v + q − p(q)] and max
q
[v + q + a
(1− δF
δF
m(q)
)
− p(q)].
The first order conditions are:
1− p′(q) = 0⇔ 1 = m
′(q)
δF
⇔ δF = 1
q′(m)
and 1 +
1− δF
δF
a′(n)m′(q)− m
′(q)
δF
= 0⇔ 1 + 1− δF
δF
a′(n)
1
q′(m)
− 1
δF q′(m)
= 0
Replacement of q′(m) with −c′(m) makes the above two equations identical to [FOC0] and [FOCA].
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A.3 Section 4.1
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P
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n
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n
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Legal 
enforcement of 
contracts 6.3 5.4 7.2 8.1 8.5 9.5 5.4 5.4 7.1 6.6 3.8 3.6 4.0 6.6 7.6 6.4 8.1 4.1 6.2 4.3 4.6 1.2 3.4 6.1 8.3 2.1 5.5 5.5 5.9 6.5 6.7
Legal System & 
Property Rights 5.8 4.9 8.7 7.7 8.9 8.3 6.4 4.3 5.2 5.8 5.0 6.9 2.5 4.5 4.1 5.3 4.4 5.0 5.2 3.0 4.2 6.7 3.9 5.3 5.7 4.6 4.4 5.1 3.6 5.1 5.8 6.3
1.2
Selection of fair trade origin countries from “producer profiles” listed at
<www.transfairusa.org/content/certification/producer profiles.php>.
Scores for “Legal enforcement of contracts” from the World Bank’s “Doing Business.”
Scores for “Legal System and Property Rights” combine an index from the PRS Group’s “International
Country Risk Guide,” and from the World Economic Forum “Global Competitiveness Report.”
These two scores can be found at Economic Freedom of the World 2007 Annual Report, The Fraser
Institute, <www.freetheworld.com>.
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